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By Stephen T. Black1 
Theft of personal property is easy to consider, but theft of information 
poses unique problems.  Courts and legislatures dealing with victims 
of data breaches grapple with whether the victim has been harmed – in 
a manner that the law can redress.  In most cases, the thief is gone, and 
the victims – the individual whose data was taken and the company it 
was entrusted to – are engaged in a lawsuit.  This article engages in a 
discussion on the nature of such “cyberdamage,” and whether a mere 
showing of damage to privacy is enough, or if a showing of financial 
harm is required. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When an individual steals from you, the damage you suffer comes 
in many forms, including the loss of property, a feeling of violation and 
invasion of privacy, and a resultant perception of being vulnerable.  
While the legal system measures the economic loss from theft, it does 
not measure well (if at all) the damage due to nonfinancial factors. For 
example, replacement value, increased insurance risk and costs paid for 
additional security may be recovered.  
Theft of personal data is a growing frontier, both for criminals and 
companies seeking to protect data.  When an individual takes personal 
data,2 either from you or from a third party you have entrusted it to, 
does the legal system interpret that as theft?  Part of the difficulty 
plaintiffs have faced is defining the nature of the harm they suffer when 
a company does not protect their information.  Is this an invasion of 
privacy?  A tort of negligence?  A breach of trust?  A crime? 
In examining these questions, this article will start with the law of 
theft, particularly as it applies to information theft, and then proceed to 
look at the law of torts.  We will then discuss the nature of personal 
information, what the law perceives as damages from the 
misappropriation of that information, and how the courts are dealing 
 
2 Laws in the United States usually refer to this data as “personally identifiable information” (PII), 
while other nations may reference “personal data”, “personal information” or “important data.” 
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with the ever-growing number of class action suits due to data 
breaches. 
I.  THE LAW OF THEFT 
A. What is “Theft?” 
The colloquial term “theft” refers to crimes involving the taking 
of a person's property without their permission. But theft in the legal 
sense may encompass more than one category of crime, and sometimes 
more than one level of seriousness. In both usages, we can start with 
the definition of theft as the unauthorized taking of property from 
another with the intent to permanently deprive them of it.  
Within the taking element, we can talk about the mechanics of 
seizing possession of property, including removing or attempting to 
remove the property from another’s possession. However, it is 
frequently the element of intent where most of the complex and 
interesting legal questions typically arise.3 
Example 1.  Tara walks by a bicycle on the street.  She takes the 
bicycle with the intent of keeping it. 
Example 2.  Tara is working on a computer at the library and sees 
a flash drive that is not hers at the workstation.  She picks it up, puts it 
in her pocket, and walks out the door with the intent of keeping it.  
What has Tara stolen?  The bicycle is an easy case, as is the actual, 
physical flash drive.  But what if Larry is a photographer, and the flash 
drive contains Larry’s latest photos? 
“At early common law, the subject of larceny was limited to 
tangible personal property, such as cash, jewelry, furniture, and 
other merchandise. The requirement of asportation excluded 
from the protection of theft law things at two ends of the 
property continuum: at one end, real property; at the other, 
intangible property such as choses-in-action, stocks, and 
bonds.”4 
B. Theft of Intangibles 
Historically, the law would not have considered Larry the victim 
of theft of his photos because it was not tangible.  But looking at the 
situation today, we would consider the loss of the flash drive to be de 
 
3 Theft Overview, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/theft-overview.html 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2019).  
4 Stuart P. Green, Introduction: Symposium on Thirteen Ways to Steal A Bicycle, 47 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 795, 796 (2013). 
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minimis, and the loss of the photos – perhaps the only copy of Larry’s 
effort – to be the greater injury.5 
“By the mid-twentieth century, … theft reform became a 
primary goal of the American Law Institute, in drafting its 
Model Penal Code, first promulgated in 1962, while in England, 
theft reform became an early goal of the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee, the precursor to the Law Commission of England 
and Wales, which drafted what would become the Theft Act of 
1968. Both efforts led to criminal codes that eliminated 
supposedly archaic distinctions such as those between larceny, 
embezzlement, and false pretenses, and replaced them with a 
more-or-less consolidated offense of ‘theft.’”6 
Does it matter whether Larry has a backup of the photos?7  Does 
it matter that Larry has been deprived of the only copy, or is it that 
someone has, without Larry’s permission, accessed his property 
without permission?  We can readily see that a theft has occurred, not 
only of the flash drive, but also of the information which was contained 
on it.  So, what happens if the information is taken without the theft of 
the thumb drive? “[I]s remote cyber bank theft more blameworthy than 
conventional bank theft? If cyber theft really is harder to detect or 
apprehend, would that fact by itself make the offender more 
culpable?”8 
Consider Larry's photographic images being taken and used 
without payment for commercial purposes. Few would doubt that 
something has been taken, but the value he is owed as compensation is 
hard to determine.  Can Larry’s photos be recreated?  Were they of an 
event that will never happen again?  Are these commercial photos, or 
“just” personal photos of Larry and friends?  If there is no other record 
of what was on the flash drive, is Larry limited in seeking only the 
replacement value of the physical drive, as opposed to the value of the 
intangible photos? 
“I believe,” [Prof. Brenner] says, that “my identity--my name-
does have . . . value and should qualify for protection under the law of 
theft.”9 As support, she cites a passage from Shakespeare's Othello: 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ‘Twas 
mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands. // But he that filches 
 
5 See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of 
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683 (2000). 
6 Green, supra note 4, at 797. 
7 See Thomas G. Field, Crimes Involving Intangible Property, 11 U. N.H. L. REV. 171 (2013). 
8 Green, supra note 4, at 803. 
9 Id. at 804. 
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from me my good name // Robs me of that which not enriches him // 
And makes me poor indeed.”10 
C. Cyber Theft 
Asportation, or "taking" is a salient element in traditional theft. 
However, cyber theft does not always involve a "taking" at all.  This 
aspect often is far less meaningful to the victim of cyber theft than the 
interference with his or her property rights. As a result, meaningful 
remuneration sometimes escapes the victim if this element is not 
properly fulfilled. 
The asportation element in cyber theft is well defined as carrying 
away a copy of someone else's data.  The victim usually still has a copy 
of the data but is no longer has sole possession or access.  What has 
been taken is the owner’s sole possession or, in other words, her right 
of private access. 11 
Stealing the sole access or possession poses challenges for 
traditional notions of the definition of property, in the theft context. 
Theft remuneration and even gradation of the offense is based upon 
value of property stolen.  The property stolen may be intangible, and 
the value may hinge on the possibility of dissemination of the data that 
devalues it commercially (in the case of Larry's professional photos) or 
invades the privacy of the owner (in the case of personal data).  Each 
case is highly fact specific. The problem with “theft,” in the 
digital/intangible/informational sense, is that we must struggle with the 
sense of the crime.  Is it that the owner of property has been deprived 
of its use?  Is it that the victim’s ownership, or possession, or maybe 
even privacy and peace has been disturbed?  Is it that access has been 
taken where it would not have been given? 
Theft and cyber theft are distinguished on the basis that theft is a 
zero-sum offense, in which sole possession of the property, such 
as funds, information, or software, is transferred from the rightful 
owner to the thief, while cybertheft is a non-zero-sum offense. 
The non-zero-sum offense consists of interfering with, rather 
than carrying away, the rightful owner's property with the 
intention to permanently, and wholly, deprive him or her of its 
possession and use. The dynamic usually involved in non-zero-
sum theft consists of the cyber-thief's copying data that belongs 
to someone else and “carrying [the copy] away.” This scenario 
 
10 Id. at 805 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3, 
http://shakespeare.mit.edu/othello/othello.3.3.html). 
11 Susan W. Brenner, Bits, Bytes, and Bicycles: Theft and "Cyber Theft", 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
817, 821 (2016). 
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does not involve a zero-sum offense because the victim retains 
possession of his or her property albeit in diminished capacity 
because the victim is no longer the sole possessor of the 
information. Unfortunately, while the dichotomy between theft 
(zero-sum transaction) and cybertheft (non-zero-sum 
transaction) can be absolute, it can also be more nuanced. The 
ambiguities that can creep in to the varieties of cyber theft are a 
function of the conceptual deficit that exists in this area.12 
In order to align cybertheft with the notion of traditional theft, we 
would have to pigeonhole what the “thief” has stolen into the notion of 
property. While we can do that (with some mental and legal 
gymnastics!13), it is not always pretty, nor is it always consistent. 
But for us, the question is not limited to the notion of theft, 
because we are really looking at the question of damage. This is a much 
broader concept, because not only does it include damage from theft, 
but it also includes damage from tort.  
These questions form an interesting background for breach 
litigation, but not a complete one. Most of the litigation does not 
involve the hacker/thief, who may not ever be found and who may not 
be operating in the same jurisdiction. What happens when the theft 
happens to a trusted third party?  To answer this question, we need to 
discuss the law of torts. 
 
II. THE LAW OF TORTS 
A. Cyber Remedies in Tort. 
Tort violations may result from intentional actions, a breach of 
duty as in negligence, or due to a violation of statutes.14  Tort liability 
depends on the existence of a legal duty – for “where there is no duty 
there is no liability.”15 
In cases of cyber breaches, there are two common types of 
defendants: 1) a hacker or thief who intentionally caused harm, and 2) 
a third-party holding data that negligently breached a duty to safeguard 
personal information.  The hacker-thief and his assets are unlikely to 
be served and attached.  He may be in another country, known merely 
by an online moniker or even an IP address, making costs of bringing 
him to court impractical.  As a result, many cases seek damages solely 
 
12 Id. 
13 See infra, Part V.B. 
14 See Tort Law Liability, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/tort-
law-liability.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
15 Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Dist., 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1996). 
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from the trusted third-party data holder, who is likely to be solvent and 
easy to serve. 
The statutory right to privacy (in tort) may be breached by third 
party data holders when they negligently fail to safeguard personal 
data. However, many financial institutions are setting a higher standard 
than that of the statutory right to privacy. For example, the policy of 
one major banking institution, which is not atypical, states in reassuring 
terms: 
The law gives you certain privacy rights. Bank of America 
gives you more. 
. . . . 
Keeping financial information secure is one of our most 
important responsibilities. We maintain physical, electronic and 
procedural safeguards to protect Customer Information. 
. . . . 
. . . All companies that act on our behalf are contractually 
obligated to keep the information we provide to them 
confidential . . . .16 
A customer reading this information would conclude, at a 
minimum, that in exchange for entrusting the bank with personal 
information, the bank agreed (1) to protect the data by means of 
physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards and (2) to keep it 
confidential. “Other language in the privacy policy reinforces those 
sensible conclusions by stressing the importance of precautions on the 
part of the customer to guard against disclosure or unauthorized use of 
account and personal information.”17 
B. Bailment as a Cause of Action for Cyber Violations 
While bailment may seem an antiquated term when referring to 
intangible assets, the concept proves relevant when a trusted third-party 
fails to safeguard personal information.  “A bailment relationship is 
said to arise where an owner, while retaining title, delivers personalty 
to another for some particular purpose upon an express or implied 
contract. The relationship includes a return of the goods to the owner 
or a subsequent disposition in accordance with his instructions.” 18  
Historically, the property may be tangible or intangible.19 
 
16 Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. 
REV. 255, n. 152 (2005). 
17 Id. at 279. 
18 Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 840 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
19 See, e.g., Liddle v. Salem Sch. Dist. No. 600, 249 Ill. App. 3d 768 (1993) (information in a 
letter was property that could be the subject of a bailment). 
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That property can include money,20 choses in action,21 negotiable 
notes, bonds, corporate stock, insurance policies, and checks.22  It can 
also include client lists,23 digital music files,24 and data and software.25 
The requirement that the property be returned has been 
overemphasized, as a disposition or destruction will suffice.  
A ‘bailment’ in its ordinary legal sense imports the delivery of 
personal property by the bailor to the bailee who keeps the 
property in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express 
or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed, and the 
property returned or duly accounted for when the special 
purpose is accomplished or that the property shall be kept until 
the bailor reclaims it.26 
Breach of the trust created by a bailment results in liability of the 
bailee for conversion. “Any unauthorized delivery of bailed property 
by a bailee—even delivery to the wrong person resulting from the 
bailee's good faith mistake—constitutes a conversion.”27 Further, 
“bailees are ‘not only liable for losses occasioned by their negligence, 
but for those which arise from innocent mistakes in the delivery of 
goods to persons not entitled to receive them.”28  
However, not every court agrees that personal identifying 
information is property.29  To be fair, there is a good argument that 
some information is not property, because it is not sensitive or private 
or unique enough.30  There are a few reasons why, at least in the context 
 
20 In re LGI Energy Solutions, Inc., 460 B.R. 720, 728 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). 
21 Van Wagoner v. Buckley, 148 A.D. 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912). 
22 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
23 See, e.g., Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 9 Misc. 3d 589 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
24 Marchello v. Perfect Little Prods., Inc., 94 A.D.3d 825 (Sup. Ct. 2012).   
25 David Barr Realtors, Inc. v. Sadei, No. 03-97-00138-CV, 1998 WL 333954 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1998).   
26 Weinberg v. Wayco Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Mo. App. 1966). 
27 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wagner Fur, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1101, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.1991) 
(emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234 and § 234 cmt. a.). 
28 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1106 (10th Cir. 
2004) (internal citations omitted). 
29 Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Enslin v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 739 Fed. Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2018); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (social security numbers and credit card information stolen from a computer 
were not property for purposes of the law of bailment); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer 
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974-75 (“the Court is hard pressed to conceive of 
how Plaintiffs' Personal Information could be construed to be personal property so that Plaintiffs 
somehow ‘delivered’ this property to Sony and then expected it be returned.”) In re Target Corp. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach of Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177.   
30 Ree v. Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. 
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S.Ct. 1373 (2019) (Congress recognized that credit card 
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of breach litigation, that this argument is flawed.  First, the fact that 
some hacker found value in the information speaks to the fact that 
information can be treated as property.  Recognizing the fact that the 
hacker will package the information and then sell it to others leaves us 
begging the question … did the hacker have property?  Was it stolen? 
Second, the whole concept of identity theft recognizes, at least on 
some level, that a person’s identity can be a protectable, legally-
cognizable right.31 And finally, entire industries exist because “data is 
power.”32  Google, Facebook and numerous others have built empires 
based on this market reality. Furthermore, when one company 
exchanges information for consideration with another company, what 
do you call the information but property? 
This mental exercise just leads us back to the original question: 
Has the victim, who entrusted her PII to a store, suffered harm when 
that information is taken?  Is the store liable?  Is this a matter of trust 
(both in the colloquial sense as well as the legal sense)? 
C.   Conversion  
Once a bailee has received property from another, they have a 
duty to return or account for the property.  But what standard do we 
apply to ascertain a breach of that duty?  Ordinary negligence?  Gross 
negligence?  Is the bailee a fiduciary?33 
If we find conversion, what is the measure of damages?  We can’t 
reseal Pandora’s Box, or restore privacy, although courts and 
legislatures would love to try.34  
III. OTHER BASES FOR LIABILITY 
A. Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, enacted 
to promote the “confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper 
utilization”35 of consumer information reported by consumer reporting 
 
information was sensitive). 
31 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
32 Frederike Kaltheuner & Elettra Bietti, Data is Power: Towards Additional Guidance on 
Profiling and Automated Decision-Making in the GDPR, 2 J. INFO. RIGHTS POL’Y & PRAC. 
(2017), https://journals.winchesteruniversitypress.org/index.php/jirpp/article/view/45 
[https://perma.cc/8YMX-EYLS]. 
33 See Richard. H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform 
Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. OF KAN. L. REV.97 (1992). 
34 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014), http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK; Council Regulation 
2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (119) 1, https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/. 
35 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
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agencies. It was intended to protect consumers from the willful and/or 
negligent inclusion of inaccurate information in their credit reports.36 
The FCRA requires that any “consumer reporting agency” – 
which includes organizations that “regularly…assembl[e] or evaluat[e] 
consumer credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing consumer 
reports to third parties”37 – that “fails to comply with any requirement 
imposed under [the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to 
that consumer…”. 38 
However, the FCRA is old.  It was enacted in 1970 and was not 
designed as a remedy or enabling legislation for modern data breaches.  
Plaintiffs looking for federal jurisdiction through the FCRA find it 
difficult to shoehorn their claims into the FCRA’s language of 
“furnishing consumer reports.”39 
As will be discussed below, when looking at Article III standing, 
the Third Circuit has considered the violation of the FCRA alone to be 
sufficient injury for standing to exist.40 
B. State Law Claims 
A number of data breach causes of action are found in state law, 
including claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion 
of privacy and unjust enrichment.41  These claims do not grant federal 
jurisdiction, and are limited to the plaintiffs who reside in that state. 
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands have legislation requiring private or governmental 
entities to disclose security breaches involving PII.42  Not all of these 
 
36 “Liability for negligent violations of the FCRA is created by 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Liability for 
willful violations is created by 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, which also provides for punitive damages 
upon a finding of willful noncompliance.” Krajewski v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 
596, 613 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f); see also 16 CFR Part 681.1. 
38 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 
39 See, e.g., Holmes v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 WL 2873892, 
at *15 (D. W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012). 
40 See infra VI.C.3.a. 
41 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016); see 
also Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012). 
42 Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 
29, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx. 
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grant a private right of action to victims,43 but some do,44 and some 
courts and executive officers are reading in private rights.45 
The difficulty is that, both for companies who process PII and for 
their customers, it creates a patchwork of legislation, regulation, and 
compliance regimes.  Even small companies (and, for that matter, 
nonprofits, hospitals, schools, etc.) find themselves doing business 
with individuals and entities in more than one state. The cost of 
compliance with data protection regulations continues to rise.46 
C. International Regimes 
A very small number of international data protection regimes 
purport to give victims of data breaches a private right of action.47  
GDPR Article 82(1) provides, “[a]ny person who has suffered material 
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this 
Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the 
controller or processor for the damage suffered.”48 And Article 80(2) 
provides that “the data subject shall have the right to mandate a not-
for-profit body, organisation or association … to lodge the complaint 
on his or her behalf.”49 The world continues to struggle with how to 
handle data protection. 
 
 
43 See, e.g., S.B. 318, Act No. 396 (Ala. 2018). 
44 See generally Data Breach Charts, BAKERHOSTETLER 26-27 (July 2018), 
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Bre
ach_Charts.pdf; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.  
45 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“an 
individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her 
rights under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated 
damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”). 
46 The “average cost of compliance for the organizations in our current study is $5.47 million, a 
43 percent increase from 2011 . . . .” PONEMON INST. LLC, THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 4 (Dec. 2017), 
https://dynamic.globalscape.com/files/Whitepaper-The-True-Cost-of-Compliance-with-Data-
Protection-Regulations.pdf. 
47 See, e.g., Natasha G. Kohne, Mazen Baddar & Diana E. Schaffner, Bahrain’s Personal Data 
Protection Law Now in Force, AKIN GUMP (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/cybersecurity-privacy-and-data-
protection/ag-data-dive/bahrain-s-new-data-protection-law-now-in-force.html; Privacy Bill 
2018, s 103 (N.Z.).; The Personal Data Protection Bill (Draft), 2018, s 75 (India), 
https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf; Civil Code 
(promulgated by Ministry of Justice, 2019) FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU, art. 195 (Taiwan), 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000001. 
48 See generally General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), art. 82(1), May 25, 2018, 
available at https://gdpr-info.eu/art-82-gdpr/. 
49 John Patzakis, Esq. & Craig Carpenter, GDPR Provides a Private Right of Action. Here’s Why 
That’s Important, X1 EDISCOVERY L. & TECH BLOG (Feb. 28, 2018, 8:51 AM), 
https://blog.x1discovery.com/2018/02/28/gdpr-provides-a-private-right-of-action-heres-why-
thats-important/. 
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The above image shows nations of the world who have enacted 
some form of data protection legislation with their relative levels of 
complexity.50 
IV. THE NATURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION  
The idea of being harmed by the disclosure of personal 
information depends on an understanding of what is personal 
information, which in turn forces us to ask what is private?  If the 
information is not private, then there should be no harm in its 
dissemination, whether lawful or not. 
A. PII in the United States 
The United States uses the concept of PII.  The National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)51 provides the following 
definition of PII: 
PII is any information about an individual … including (1) any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date 
and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; 
and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an 
individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and 
employment information.52 
 
50 Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
51 NATI’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://www.nist.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
52 ERIKA MCCALLISTER, TIM GRANCE, & KAREN SCARFONE, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) ES-1 (Nat’l Inst. of 
Standards and Tech, Apr. 2019) (also known as NIST Special Publication 800-122),  
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf;   Glossary, 
COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CTR., https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/personally-
identifiable-information (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).; see also Rules and Policies – Protecting 
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Why is this important? Because we recognize that not all 
information is equally private. The NIST definition includes a 
distinction between linked and linkable information, the difference 
being information that is uniquely yours (i.e. can be used to identify 
you)53 and information which, when combined with other information, 
could be used to identify you.54 
That “any other information” prong is problematic, because it 
makes the definition of PII fluid.  In a post following a 2016 speech in 
San Francisco, Jessica Rich, the Director of Bureau of Consumer 
Protection from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), mentioned the 
topic of linkable information: 
We [the FTC] regard data as ‘personally identifiable,’ and thus 
warranting privacy protections, when it can be reasonably linked 
to a particular person, computer, or device. In many cases, 
persistent identifiers such as device identifiers, MAC addresses, 
static IP addresses, or cookies meet this test. 55 
Note the expansion of PII to include the identification, not only of 
a person, but of a computer or device. 
The combination of a name with other information, for example, 
a name on a list of patients for an abortion clinic, can be PII. However, 
bits of information, taken alone, can still be PII if they can later be 
combined with other information to identify persons. 
It may also be helpful to note that many states have enacted their 
own data protection laws with PII-like definitions.  Consider the 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018: 
“‘Personal information’ means information that identifies, relates 
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably 
be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or 
household.”56  
Under the Act, personal information includes 
- names, aliases, postal addresses, unique personal identifiers, 
online identifier Internet Protocol address, email address, account 
 
PII – Privacy Act, U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacy-
program/rules-and-policies-protecting-pii-privacy-act (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
53 Examples include an email address, social security number, passport number, driver’s license 
number, and credit card number. 
54 Examples also include a common last names, date of birth, race, gender, and age. 
55 Jessica Rich, Keeping Up with the Online Advertising Industry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
(Apr. 21, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2016/04/keeping-online-advertising-industry (emphasis in original). 
56 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1),  
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375. 
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name, social security number, driver’s license number, passport 
number, or other similar identifiers. 
- records of personal property, products or services purchased, 
obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or 
tendencies. 
- biometric information. 
- internet or other electronic network activity information, 
including, but not limited to, browsing history, search history, and 
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet Web 
site, application, or advertisement. 
- geolocation data. 
- audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar 
information. 
- professional, employment-related or education information. 
- inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this 
subdivision to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the 
consumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, 
preferences, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, 
and aptitudes.57 
B. Personal Information in the EU 
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) defines 
Personal data as the following: 
For the purposes of this Regulation: 
(1) 'personal data' means any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); 
an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person.58 
Recital 30 expands on this. “Natural persons may be associated 
with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and 
protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or 
other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags.  This may 
leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers 
 
57 Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1)(A)-(K).   
58 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (119) 1, http://www.privacy-
regulation.eu/en/article-4-definitions-GDPR.htm. 
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and other information received by the servers, may be used to create 
profiles of the natural persons and identify them.”59 
The GDPR took effect in May of 2018, and there are many 
questions yet unanswered about its scope and effect.  However, at least 
initially, we can note that the GDPR’s definition is broader, in that it 
attempts to include direct or indirect identification and does not require 
the information to identify the person, but that the person could be 
“identifiable.” 
C. Personal Information in China 
China’s Personal Information Security Specification took effect 
in May 2018. The Specification is the “effective centerpiece of an 
emerging system around personal data,” which includes the 2017 
Cybersecurity Law.60  The CSL loosely defines both personal data and 
a new category of personal sensitive data, which may include “data that 
may lead to bodily harm, property damage, reputational harm, harm to 
personal heath, or discriminative treatment of an individual if such data 
is disclosed, leaked or abused.”61 
V. DAMAGES 
A. The Case or Controversy Clause and Cyber Theft 
When no financial harm has been experienced yet by the victims 
of cyber theft of data, the circuit courts are split as to whether a case or 
controversy exists.   
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
 
59 Council Regulation 2016/679, Recital 30, 2016 O.K. (119) 1, http://www.privacy-
regulation.eu/en/r30.htm. 
60 Mingli Shi, Samm Sacks, Qiheng Chen, & Graham Webster, Translation: China’s Personal 
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between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.62 
“[S]etting apart the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the 
justiciable sort referred to in Article III—'serv[ing] to identify those 
disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial 
process,’—is the doctrine of standing.”63 
The Supreme Court has established three elements of Article III 
standing:  
1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized; 
2) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting 
injury; and 
3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressable by the 
court.64 
In breach cases, Article III standing usually comes into play with 
respect to elements 1 and 2. 
With respect to the “concreteness” element, defendants have 
argued that although they admit a breach, plaintiffs were not harmed.  
This happens because at the time of the litigation, very few plaintiffs 
may be able to show financial injury.  There may be personal 
information exposed, but how many fraudulent credit transactions or 
identity theft cases follow?  And, at least in a few of the cases, the bank 
or the defendant offers to cover the cost of the fraud, thus the plaintiff 
is made whole – at least in one financial sense. 
With regard to the causal element, defendants have argued that 
plaintiffs have not proven that their action – allowing a breach to occur 
or failing to protect customer data – is the cause of the plaintiffs’ injury.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that this element can lead to a very 
attenuated, speculative chain of events, and has held that no standing 
exists in these instances.65 
One major difficulty all these cases demonstrate is that the data 
thief is not in court.  The plaintiff has suffered an injury at the hacker’s 
hand, but the data is being held by a third party. While the state of 
cyberlaw is changing, plaintiffs and lawmakers struggle with the 
question of whether to hold data processors liable, for how much, and 
to whom?  Besides the public shock at having trust eroded, and the 
violation of identity theft, is it appropriate, under Article III, to hold a 
business accountable to all the public? Whose records were taken?  
Whose records were misused (and is that even a concern)? 
 
62 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
63 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
64 Id. at 560-61. 
65 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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At the beginning of the article, we asked about stolen bicycles.  
Theft of a tangible item deprives the user of all enjoyment and use.  
Does “theft” accurately describe misappropriation of data? 
Conversion or trespass is understandable with tangible property, 
but does it accurately describe the relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant store, hospital, or insurance company?  A bailee is 
liable if she cannot account for the property entrusted to her care, but 
is personal information bailable property?  Does the mere violation of 
a statute create a cognizable injury for standing purposes? 
These are the questions confronting the courts, who have been 
facing a growing number of breaches and a growing number of class 
action filings.  The circuit courts of appeal have split on the issue of 
whether, at the pleading stage, Article III standing has been adequately 
plead if no financial harm can be shown to exist … yet. 
B. Circuit Court Split 
1. CareFirst 
The Court’s denial of certiorari is clearly good news for the 
Plaintiffs, and may signal that the Supreme Court, at least as of 
now, is comfortable with the ongoing split among courts of 
appeal over the viability of data breach class actions in federal 
court.  The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C Circuits have 
permitted data breach class actions to proceed based on a fear 
of identity theft, whereas the First, Third and Fourth have not.  
(The Third Circuit, however, has allowed a data breach class 
action to proceed based on violation of the FCRA’s 
confidentiality requirements.)  There is a modest trend among 
Courts of Appeal that have recently addressed the issue to find 
that standing exists in data breach class actions where the breach 
was caused by cybercriminals.66 
What did the Appeals Court in Attias v. CareFirst think was the 
injury? 
After discussing cases which analyzed Article III standing based 
on risk of future injury, the court made this statement: “Under our 
precedent, ‘the proper way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim 
is to consider the ultimate alleged harm,’ which in this case would be 
identity theft, ‘as the concrete and particularized injury and then to 
 
66 Phillip N. Yannella & Edward J. McAndrew, Supreme Court Denies Cert Petition in Carefirst 
v. Attias, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-
court-denies-cert-petition-carefirst-v-attias. 
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determine whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an 
individual citizen sufficiently ‘imminent’ for standing purposes.’”67 
But what did the court think identify theft was? “Nobody doubts 
that identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would 
constitute a concrete and particularized injury. The remaining question, 
then, keeping in mind the light burden of proof the plaintiffs bear at the 
pleading stage, is whether the complaint plausibly alleges that the 
plaintiffs now face a substantial risk of identity theft as a result of 
CareFirst’s alleged negligence in the data breach.”68 
The court then went on the analyze the district court’s dismissal 
of the complaint “because they [plaintiffs] had ‘not suggested, let alone 
demonstrated, how the CareFirst hackers could steal their identities 
without access to their social security or credit card numbers….’”69 
Here’s a flaw in the argument. Is the harm suffered by the 
plaintiffs limited to the potential to have their identities stolen?  Or has 
the harm already occurred, because PII stored by a trusted source been 
exposed to outsiders? 
“So we have specific allegations in the complaint that CareFirst 
collected and stored “PII/PHI/Sensitive Information,” a category of 
information that includes credit card and social security numbers; that 
PII, PHI, and sensitive information were stolen in the breach; and that 
the data “accessed on Defendants’ servers” place plaintiffs at a high 
risk of financial fraud. The complaint thus plausibly alleges that the 
CareFirst data breach exposed customers’ social security and credit 
card numbers. CareFirst does not seriously dispute that plaintiffs would 
face a substantial risk of identity theft if their social security and credit 
card numbers were accessed by a network intruder, and, drawing on 
“experience and common sense,” we agree.”70 
We can see the court struggling with the right answer but 
approaching it from the wrong starting point.  This is understandable, 
if we consider that the only harm is to have someone masquerade as 
you and obtain financial gain fraudulently.   
But if we return to my stolen bicycle, the harm occurs not when 
someone else decides to ride it (although conceptually we could then 
put a “lost opportunity cost” dollar figure to that), but when someone 
 
67 Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 981 (2018) 
(citing Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 915 (quoting Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 628. 
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takes the bike out of my garage.  The harm is that I’ve been deprived 
of the bike, and not necessarily that someone else is using it. 
Does that analogy translate directly to PII?  Part of the problem 
the Court is struggling with is the nature of digital information.  Unlike 
the bike, it can be copied multiple times, and the original (if such a 
concept exists!) is not diminished by the use of the copies. But is that 
the true nature of the injury? 
2. Privacy Redux 
In 1890, two young Boston attorneys wrote an essay for the 
Harvard Law Review entitled, “The Right to Privacy.”71 In it they 
argued that the law protects the privacy of individuals against wrongful 
intrusion. “We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, 
whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from 
special trust, but are rights as against the world; and, as above state, the 
principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not 
the principle of private property [which may be the subject of identity 
theft, for example] …. The principle which protects personal writings 
and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right 
to privacy ….”72 
Looking to theft for protection from a breach focuses on the nature 
of PII as property.  It may indeed be property in the hands of the third-
party possessor, but that inquiry focuses on the website or business that 
has collected the information of another.  For them, theft of property 
may be the right legal issue.73 The more relevant inquiry for the 
individual whose information is should be: has their privacy been 
invaded?  Has wrongful intrusion occurred? 
Notice that if the answer to those questions is “yes”, then we have 
satisfied the injury in fact question rather neatly.  We do not need to 
entertain the question raised by many courts of whether the injury is 
speculative or lies in the future, for an injury to privacy occurs upon 




71 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193. 
72 Id. 
73 But see Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs 
also claim that they have a property right to their personally identifiable data, and that the theft of 
their data supports standing just as well as the theft of one's car would. But the only authority to 
which they direct us is Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618 (7th Cir.2014), 
which says nothing of the kind.”). 
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3. Courts That Found Standing 
a. Third Circuit 
In In re: Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach 
Litigation, the court recognized that “In the context of a motion to 
dismiss, we have held that the [i]njury-in-fact element is not Mount 
Everest. The contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not 
precisely defined, are very generous, requiring only that claimant 
allege[ ] some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.”74  
In fact, the Third Circuit seems to be the most generous in terms 
of allowing standing. 
In November of 2013, two laptop computers containing 
unencrypted personal information of more than 839,000 customers 
were stolen from Horizon’s headquarters.75  After discovering the theft, 
Horizon notified law enforcement immediately, and then alerted 
customers by letter and a press release a month later, on December 6, 
stating that there were differing amounts of PII that may have been 
exposed.76  Some, but not all of the plaintiffs suffered direct financial 
harm (including one plaintiff who had a fraudulent tax return filed in 
his name).77 
The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding “that standing 
requires some form of additional, “specific harm,” beyond “mere 
violations of statutory and common law rights[.]””78  Although the 
court was convinced that at least one of the plaintiffs had suffered a 
harm that would meet any of the Article III standards we have 
previously discussed, the court proceeded to address the issue of 
whether a violation of a statute can give rise to Article III standing 
without additional concrete financial harm.79  The court agreed that it 
could citing several Supreme Court cases as precedent.80 
 
 
74 In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
75 Id. at 630. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 634. 
79 Id. at 635. 
80 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual or threatened injury required by 
Art[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipses omitted)); Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion 
of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”). 
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Next, the Court looked at its own history of Article III litigation, 
and noted that it had not been consistent.81  But the court pointed to two 
recent cases, In re Google82 and In re Nickelodeon,83 for the 
propositions that: 
- so long as an injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way,” the plaintiff need not “suffer any particular 
type of harm to have standing.”84  
- “the actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may 
exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing,” even absent evidence of 
actual monetary loss;85 and 
- “when it comes to laws that protect privacy, a focus on 
economic loss is misplaced” and “the unlawful disclosure of 
legally protected information” is “a clear de facto injury.”86 
The court then turned to Spokeo.87  “Although it is possible to read 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo as creating a requirement that 
a plaintiff show a statutory violation has caused a “material risk of 
harm” before he can bring suit,”88 the court noted that the Supreme 
Court “rejected the argument that an injury must be “tangible” in order 
to be “concrete.””89  Instead, Spokeo teaches that Congress “has the 
power to define injuries,”90 including intangible injuries that give rise 
to Article III standing.  However, “there are some circumstances where 
the mere technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute 
cannot, in and of itself, constitute an injury in fact.”91 
Judge Schwartz, concurring, decided that the theft of the laptop 
showed invasion of privacy, and therefore, no additional analysis was 






81 In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635. 
82 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015). 
83 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). 
84 In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 134. 
85 Id. 
86 In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 272-274. 
87 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 1540. 
88 Noting that the Eighth Circuit had read the case in just that way. In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 637. 
89 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 1549. 
90  Id. 
91 In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638. 
92 Id. at 641. 
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b. Sixth Circuit 
In Galaria v. Nationwide,93 plaintiffs brought putative class 
actions after hackers breached the computer network of Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiffs alleged invasion of privacy, 
negligence, and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).94 
The district court dismissed the complaints, concluding that plaintiffs 
had failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy, lacked Article III 
standing to bring the negligence claims, and lacked statutory standing 
to bring the FCRA claims.95 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs 
had Article III standing and that the district court erred in dismissing 
the FCRA claims.  With respect to Article III standing, the Court 
proceeded with the Spokeo96 three element test for standing: (1) There 
must be an injury, (2) it must be fairly traceable to the conduct being 
challenged, and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable 
decision.97  
With respect to the first prong, the court explained that an injury 
must be actual or imminent, and then decided to follow the other courts 
that have dealt with this issue by assuming that data theft occurs in two 
phases --- the lifting of the data, and then the misuse of the data.98  I 
will explain later why this is an incorrect way of looking at data breach 
damages, but here the Court reaches the right result. “Here, Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably 
incurred mitigation costs, are sufficient to establish a cognizable 
Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation.”99  In fact, the 
court almost gets it right.   
There is no need for speculation where Plaintiffs allege that 
their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of ill-
intentioned criminals….Thus, although it might not be ‘literally 
certain’ that Plaintiffs’ data will be misused, there is a 
sufficiently substantial risk of harm that incurring mitigation 
costs is reasonable. Where Plaintiffs already know that they 
have lost control of their data, it would be unreasonable to 
expect Plaintiffs to wait for actual misuse—a fraudulent charge 
on a credit card, for example—before taking steps to ensure 
 
93 Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2016). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 387. 
96 Injury is “the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388 
(citing Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547). 
97 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
98 Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388-89. 
99 Id. at 388. 
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their own personal and financial security, particularly when 
Nationwide recommended taking these steps.100 
As we can see, the Court was more persuaded that plaintiffs’ 
mitigation costs, coupled with Nationwide’s offer of credit monitoring, 
was enough to show injury.  Left for another day was the issue of 
whether the theft itself was injury enough. 
The majority had no issues with the other two prongs of the test, 
but the dissent was bothered that the second factor of traceability was 
not met.  
The complaints simply allege that hackers were in fact able to 
access the plaintiffs’ personal information. From that fact, the 
complaints conclude that Nationwide failed to protect that 
information. But plaintiffs make no factual allegations 
regarding how the hackers were able to breach Nationwide’s 
system, nor do they indicate what Nationwide might have done 
to prevent that breach but failed to do.101 
This may have been both a pleading issue and a fundamental 
misunderstanding that the plaintiff has some duty to show how a breach 
occurred.  This is not the case in other areas of the law.  For example, 
in bailment, “a bailor need prove only (1) the contract of bailment, (2) 
delivery of the bailed property to the bailee and (3) failure of the bailee 
to redeliver the bailed property undamaged at the termination of the 
bailment.”102  It is not the bailor’s duty to plead how the property was 
lost or damaged.  Why should it be so with data? 
c. Seventh Circuit 
In 2013, hackers stole approximately 350,000 credit card numbers 
of Neiman Marcus customers.103 The company learned of the breach in 
mid-December but kept the information confidential at first.104  Neiman 
Marcus discovered potential malware in its computer systems on 
January 1, 2014 but waited until January 10, 2014 to announce the 
breach to the public, at which point several customers sued pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).105  The district 
court granted Neiman Marcus’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack 




101 Id. at 392. 
102 David v. Lose, 218 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio 1966). 
103 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 691. 
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d. Ninth Circuit 
In Zappos,107 more than 24 million customers had their “names, 
account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping 
addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card 
information”108 taken by hackers.  In the resulting class action 
litigation, “some of the plaintiffs alleged that the hackers used stolen 
information about them to conduct subsequent financial transactions” 
while some did not.109 The appeal to the Ninth Circuit was based on the 
latter claims and focused on the hacking incident itself (not any 
subsequent illegal activity). 
This is the second data breach case alleging problems with 
standing to appear before the Ninth Circuit.  The court considered 
whether the prior case, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,110 was still good 
law after the Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA.111  The court concluded that it was,112 and that 
Krottner and Clapper were reconcilable.  First, the court recognized 
that the “injury in Krottner did not require a speculative multi-link 
chain of inferences. The Krottner laptop thief had all the information 
he needed to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names—
actions that Krottner collectively treats as ‘identity theft.’”113  Second, 
the type of theft is important.  Krottner involved the theft of PII on a 
laptop, while Clapper involved surveillance procedures authorized by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.114  Clapper involved 
questions of national security and separation of powers,115 which did 
not arise in Krottner. Third, the focus in Clapper was on the impending 
nature of the alleged injury, but the court noted that other cases have 
correctly focused on whether there is a “substantial risk” of injury (and 
not necessarily just an “impending” risk”.116 
Having decided that Krottner would control in the case, the court 
noted that this case also involved the theft of credit card numbers 
(which were not stolen in Krottner), and that Congress had recognized 
that credit card numbers are “sufficiently sensitive to warrant 
 
107 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. 
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S.Ct. 1373 (2019). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010). 
111 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
112 In re Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1023. 
113 Id. at 1026. 
114 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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legislation prohibiting merchants from printing such numbers on 
receipts.”117 
Zappos countered by arguing that even if the information which 
was taken was sensitive, finding standing is not appropriate because 
too much time had passed (the breach occurred in 2012, and the case 
was argued in 2018), and therefore, the alleged harm was 
speculative.118  The court noted that argument might be appropriate 
later, but not for the motion to dismiss stage.119  “Plaintiffs also 
specifically allege that ‘[a] person whose PII has been obtained and 
compromised may not see the full extent of identity theft or identity 
fraud for years.’”120  
e. Eleventh Circuit 
In Resnick v. AvMed, Inc.,121 the defendant had two laptops taken 
from their corporate office in Gainesville, Florida in December of 
2009. The laptops contained customers' sensitive information, 
including protected health information, Social Security numbers, 
names, addresses, and phone numbers.122 AvMed did not encrypt the 
data, and the laptops were sold to a fence, along with PII from 
approximately 1.2 million current and former AvMed members.123 
The court spent some time going through each of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, but in the end, did not have a difficult time, since the named 
parties had both been victims of identity theft, and had suffered 
financial harm.  The court (and the dissent) spent more time looking at 
the issue of causation.124 
4. Courts That Denied Standing 
a. First Circuit 
In Katz v. Pershing, LLC,125 the plaintiff had a brokerage account 
with a company that used the defendant’s software service to “make its 
clients' nonpublic personal information, including social security 
numbers and taxpayer identification numbers, accessible to certain 
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1028-29. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).   
122 Id. at 1322. 
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authorized end-users….”126  The court struggled with the concept of 
standing.  The plaintiff had privacy and identity theft concerns, and had 
even purchased identity monitoring services, but had no financial harm 
due to actual identity theft.127 
The complaint alleged several state law claims, but the court still 
found no actual injury.  
[T]he plaintiff has not alleged that her nonpublic personal 
information actually has been accessed by any unauthorized 
person. Her cause of action rests entirely on the hypothesis that 
at some point an unauthorized, as-yet unidentified, third party 
might access her data and then attempt to purloin her identity. 
The conjectural nature of this hypothesis renders the plaintiff's 
case readily distinguishable from cases in which confidential 
data actually has been accessed through a security breach and 
persons involved in that breach have acted on the ill-gotten 
information.128 
b. Second Circuit 
In Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the plaintiff used her card at 
Michaels Stores, and, following a breach of Michaels’ network, 
discovered that her card was used twice in locations in Ecuador.129  She 
prompted cancelled her card, and her bank took care of the fraudulent 
charge attempts.130 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court 
that she lacked Article III standing, noting that she did not have any 
actual monetary damage with respect to the fraudulent charges, nor 
would she in the future, since the card was cancelled and no other PII 
was taken.131  The court further remarked that she did not plead how 






126 Id. at 69–70. 
127 Id. at 79. 
128 Id. at 79–80. 
129 Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
130 Id. 
131 Additionally, she does not allege how she can plausibly face a threat of future fraud, because 
her stolen credit card was promptly canceled after the breach and no other personally identifying 
information—such as her birth date or Social Security number—is alleged to have been stolen. 
Id. 
132 Cf. P.F. Chang's, 819 F.3d at 967 (“P.F. Chang's accepts Remijas's holding that the time and 
money spent resolving fraudulent charges are cognizable injuries for Article III standing.”). 
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c. Fourth Circuit 
In Beck v. McDonald,133 veterans who received medical treatment 
and health care at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Columbia, 
South Carolina sued after the theft of a laptop compromised their 
personal information. In February of 2013, a laptop went missing from 
the Center.134 “The laptop contain[ed] unencrypted personal 
information of approximately 7,400 patients, including names, birth 
dates, the last four digits of social security numbers, and physical 
descriptors (age, race, gender, height, and weight).”135 
An internal investigation was conducted and concluded that the 
laptop was likely stolen and that the Center failed to follow the policies 
for storing patient information.136 The Center notified every affected 
patient and offered one year of free credit monitoring. The laptop was 
never recovered.137 
Notice that the pleading in Beck was limited, listing only the 
“threat of current and future substantial harm from identity theft and 
other misuse of [Plaintiffs’] Personal Information.”138  The plaintiffs 
sought relief under the Privacy Act, the APA, and common law 
negligence.139 
The district court initially dismissed the negligence claims, and 
after extensive discovery, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
because the plaintiffs had “not submitted evidence sufficient to create 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they face a ‘certainly 
impending’ risk of identity theft.”140 
In addressing the standing issue, the Fourth Circuit struggled with 
the issue of actual versus speculative harm, and was swayed by the 
“attenuated chain of possibilities” rejected in Clapper.141  
[W]e must assume that the thief targeted the stolen items for the 
personal information they contained. And in both cases, the 
thieves must then select, from thousands of others, the personal 
information of the named plaintiffs and attempt successfully to 
 
133 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Beck v. Shulkin, 137 
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140 Id. at 267–68 (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422.). 
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use that information to steal their identities. This ‘attenuated 
chain’ cannot confer standing.142 
The court put a heavy burden on plaintiffs.  Recognizing that the 
breaches occurred years before, the court noted the “plaintiffs have 
uncovered no evidence that the information contained on the stolen 
laptop has been accessed or misused or that they have suffered identity 
theft, nor, for that matter, that the thief stole the laptop with the intent 
to steal their private information”143 and “‘as the breaches fade further 
into the past,’ the Plaintiffs’ threatened injuries become more and more 
speculative.”144  Telling is the fact that the court included this quote 
from the district court in the Zappos breach. “[T]he passage of time 
without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact suffered the 
harm they fear must mean something.”145 
The plaintiffs did manage to argue that there is “no need to 
speculate”146 because they alleged that their personal information had 
been stolen. The court explicitly accepted that to be true, but held “the 
mere theft of [the laptop and personal information], without more, 
cannot confer Article III standing.”147 The court cited Randolph v. ING 
Life Ins. & Annuity Co.,148 persuaded by the argument in that case that 
“although plaintiffs clearly alleged their information was stolen by a 
burglar, they did ‘not allege that the burglar who stole the laptop did so 
in order to access their [i]nformation, or that their [i]nformation ha[d] 
actually been accessed since the laptop was stolen.’”149 
d. Eighth Circuit 
In June and July of 2014, the network that processes credit card 
transactions for 1,045 grocery stores was hacked, and names, account 
numbers, expiration dates, card verification value (CVV) codes, and 
personal identification numbers were exfiltrated.150  Interestingly, the 
court stated: “[b]y harvesting the data on the network, the hackers stole 
customers’ Card Information.”151 
In September of the same year, defendants announced a second 
data breach had occurred, with different malicious software onto the 
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same network.152 Sixteen plaintiffs sued, and the district court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding that “none of the 
plaintiffs had alleged an injury-in-fact and thus they did not have 
standing.”153 
The court considered the injury-in-fact and traceability issues.  
However, the court was troubled by the eventual use of the stolen 
information, rather than the fact that the information was stolen in the 
first place.  “Drawing all inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, we are 
satisfied that the complaint sufficiently alleges that the hackers stole 
plaintiffs’ Card Information. Plaintiffs, however, ask us to go further 
and conclude that the complaint has adequately alleged that their Card 
Information has been misused.”154 
Great weight was placed upon the risk of identity theft and credit 
card fraud, and whether it had occurred or would likely occur in the 
future.  All parties agreed that identity theft would constitute an injury-
in-fact.  What they seemed to miss is that there are other injuries 
involving data theft (e.g. extortion, loss of privacy), besides the fact 
that data theft is theft, too.  Note this comment from the court, which 
seems to miss the mark: “[o]ur task is to determine whether plaintiffs’ 
allegations plausibly demonstrate that the risk that plaintiffs will suffer 
future identity theft is substantial.”155 
In trying to pigeonhole a data breach into an identity theft claim, 
all parties and the courts miss the fact that data has been 
misappropriated, and that misappropriation is a current injury. 
VI. AN INCORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF 
CYBERDAMAGES?  
We began by discussing the theft of a bicycle, the theft of a flash 
drive, and the theft of the information contained on the flash drive.  The 
first two cases are relatively easy; the third causes us some pause.  
When information is wrongfully accessed, is there injury? 
That the plaintiffs have suffered a harm in most data breach cases 
is not in question.  If these cases involved only the hacker and the 
plaintiff, and the hacker lifted the information directly from the 
plaintiff, we would see very clearly any number of theories for liability, 
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including intrusion upon seclusion,156 appropriation of another’s 
identity or likeness,157 and, in some cases, theft.158 
When the plaintiff’s information is taken from a trusted third 
party, courts have struggled to 1) find the injury, especially absent 
actual identity theft, although this trend is changing as we become more 
familiar with data breaches, and 2) to assign blame for the injury upon 
the third party.  We see several reasons why. 
First, injuries in the data breach cases sometimes involve actual 
monetary damage, but many times do not (or the monetary damage is 
too attenuated from the breach to be able to meet the causation 
requirement).  Sometimes the harm of identity theft is mitigated by the 
victim or a third party, and the public (and the courts?) think, “Whew!” 
We shouldn’t find a lot of solace in this.  Legislatures the world 
over have looked at these breaches and listened to their constituents.  
Business leaders lose sleep over the thought that, in the current political 
climate, customers are demanding security and privacy, and when a 
breach occurs, they expect compensation, sometimes despite the best 
efforts of the business to keep their data safe.159 
Second, courts and law makers are trying to understand the nature 
of the harm.  Is it trespass?  Invasion of privacy?  Breach of trust?  
Conversion?  Which legal theory is the correct one, and how does that 
help us understand when an injury is redressable, and when it’s not? 
Property (if data is property?)160 is copiable, so what is the harm 
in another copy?  Just change your password!  But this does not agree 
with our legal history of theft or tort.  It doesn’t agree with the public’s 
notion of privacy (even when that privacy is crowd-shared and tweeted 
for all to see). 
Third, courts and companies are struggling with the concept of 
damage.  If there is an injury, how much is it worth?  We’ve rushed 
headlong into a digital society, with all its apps and connectivity, but 
the law is still trying to decide what the ground rules are.  Are we open 
with no secrets, or are there still some things that are not for public 
viewing?  If so, how much are those things worth?  
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Finally, are we looking at damages from the wrong point of view?  
A hacker may steal information for a number of reasons, including 1) 
to sell the information, 2) to shut down a computer or network, 3) to 
extort the owner of the information, or 4) to use the information herself.  
In each case, we see the hacker receiving enrichment wrongfully, while 
at the same time we may look at the individual and (legally) see no 
injury. 
CONCLUSION 
“[T]he average lawyer is not merely ignorant of science, he or she 
has an affirmative aversion to it.”161 
“As a general matter, lawyers and science don't mix.”162 
We start with these two statements for both entertainment value 
and as a cautionary tale.  On the one hand, it’s amusing to think that 
the law (and lawyers and courts) has an aversion to technology and 
science when we rush into the breach whenever technology doesn’t 
work.  The speed with which putative class actions are formed seems 
to prove that no such enmity exists. 
On the other hand, the law (and lawyers and the courts) are 
creatures of habit and precedent.  We love tying technology, science, 
the internet, and anything intangible to theories that we have grown to 
love and adore for centuries.  When we do so, sometimes we find that 
the fit is more “round peg in a square hole” than “hand in glove.” 
There are a lot of square holes in breach litigation.  Statutes can 
be vague or use language that no longer applies.  Common law actions 
such as bailment or trespass don’t quite fit when there is no land, 
chattel, or maybe even property to speak of. 
As we face more data breaches each year, courts and legislatures 
will have to confront the tough issues of damage and liability, standing 
and causation, and injury in a data driven world.  
Digital freedom stops where that of users begins... Nowadays, 
digital evolution must no longer be a customer trade-off 
between privacy and security. Privacy is not to sell, it's a 
valuable asset to protect.163 
As they confront those issues, courts and legislatures will have to 
reconcile our changing notions of what constitutes harm from cyber 
theft. Because much of the litigation is one victim suing another, the 
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real harm tends to be obscured.  Instead we ask whether one of the 
victims was negligent in protecting the data, and whether the other 
victim really had anything stolen.  Since the thief is long gone, we tend 
to look for justice from the only people who are left. 
